TY - JOUR
T1 - On the approximate controllability of stackelberg-nash strategies for stokes equations
AU - Guillén-González, F.
AU - Marques-Lopes, F.
AU - Rojas-Medar, M.
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - We study a Stackelberg strategy subject to the evolutionary Stokes equations, considering a Nash multi-objective equilibrium (not necessarily cooperative) for the "follower players" (as they are called in the economy field) and an optimal problem for the leader player with approximate controllability objective. We will obtain the following three main results: the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and its characterization, the approximate controllability of the Stokes system with respect to the leader control and the associate Nash equilibrium, and the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg-Nash problem and its characterization.
AB - We study a Stackelberg strategy subject to the evolutionary Stokes equations, considering a Nash multi-objective equilibrium (not necessarily cooperative) for the "follower players" (as they are called in the economy field) and an optimal problem for the leader player with approximate controllability objective. We will obtain the following three main results: the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and its characterization, the approximate controllability of the Stokes system with respect to the leader control and the associate Nash equilibrium, and the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg-Nash problem and its characterization.
KW - Approximate controllability
KW - Multi-objective optimization
KW - Stackelberg-Nash strategies
KW - Stokes equations
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84874271204
U2 - 10.1090/S0002-9939-2012-11459-5
DO - 10.1090/S0002-9939-2012-11459-5
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84874271204
SN - 0002-9939
VL - 141
SP - 1759
EP - 1773
JO - Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society
JF - Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society
IS - 5
ER -